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The classic paper by Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) analyzed the implications of ‘tariff- 
jumping’ direct foreign investment (DFI) induced by the imposition of an import tariff. We 
analyze a new type of DFI where it occurs with a view to defusing, not circumventing, 
protection or rather the threat of protection by the host country. An example is the DFI by 
Japan in the United States. The decision about the level of foreign investment is taken in the 
tirst of a two-period horizon period. This, together with the level of exports in the first period, 
determines the probability of a quota on exports being imposed in the second period. Policy 
makers aware of the effects of the first-period decisions on the second period will impose an 
optimal tariff and an optimal tax (subsidy) on capital exports. 
1. Introduction 
Economists are familiar with the phenomenon of ‘tariff-jumping’ direct 
foreign investment (DFI). The implications of such DFI have been thorough- 
ly explored, chiefly by Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), Uzawa (1969), 
Hamada (1974) and others.’ But recently, we have witnessed an interesting 
*In view of Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro’s seminal contributions to the analysis of direct foreign 
investment, his interest in political economy, and his eagerness to embrace new ideas, we hope 
that this paper will be a fitting tribute to his memory. An earlier version of the paper entitled 
‘Quid Pro Quo Foreign Investment and Optimal Policv Intervention’ anoeared as Columbia 
University Discussion Paper no. 323, Februaiy, 1986. . 
1 I 
‘There is a voluminous analytical literature by now on this subject; e.g., Brecher and Findlay 
(1983). The policy relevance of the main Brecher-Alejandro-Uzawa lindings (i.e., that tariff- 
jumping capital importation will necessarily immiserize the host country if the country continues 
to import the capital-intensive good) for explaining the lacklustre performance of the import- 
substituting strategy of development has been noted by Bhagwati (1978). 
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new type of DFI where it occurs with a view to defusing, not circumventing, 
protection or rather the threat of protection by the host country. This seems 
to be the case with a significant amount of current DFI from Japan into the 
United States. Often, the protectionist threat may even have been designed 
precisely to induce such DFI from the successful exporting country [Bhagwati 
(1980)]. Foreign investment, so induced, is properly christened quid pro quo 
DFI [Bhagwati (1985)]. 
How does DFI defuse the protectionist threat? Chiefly, this can occur 
because DFI is regarded, and can be exploited by lobbies in behalf of the 
exporting country, as a helpful phenomenon that ‘saves jobs’ in the import- 
ing country whereas the imports are ‘costing jobs’ instead. Such ‘image 
building’ can influence Congress to withstand the protectionist pressures 
from the import-competing industry. But it also can reduce that pressure 
itself by co-opting the protectionist lobbies themselves. An excellent example 
is provided by ‘the GM-Toyota deal in the United States apparently 
prompted by the threat of domestic-content protection.. . The quid pro quo 
for Toyota in this deal, which benefits GM and creates jobs for the United 
Auto Workers (UAW) Union, is evidently the conversion of GM to a free 
trader stance in local U.S. politics: this is manifest from the fact that GM 
alone among the U.S. automakers has been arguing against the extension of 
the auto VERs [Bhagwati (1985, p. 31)]. Again, unions are increasingly 
seeing DFI by the foreign exporter as a preferable job-saving alternative to 
protection2 
The novel phenomenon of quid pro quo DFI, or what might equally be 
described as ‘tariff-threat-defusing’ DFI to contrast with the ‘tariff-jumping’ 
DFI, may be a generic phenomenon, as when all Japanese DFI is seen as 
defusing the overall threat of protection against Japan. But it can also be an 
industry-specific phenomenon as when DFI in a specific industry, as in autos 
for example, helps to defuse the threat of VERs on autos. In either case, the 
optimal policy of the exporting country is influenced and must be analyzed. 
In the present paper, we analyze the generic case. A useful simplification 
then is to treat DFI as synonymous with international capital mobility, and 
to work with the conventional trade-theoretic model where factors are 
mobile intersectorally and perfect competition prevails. The key idea on 
which we focus is that capital inflow from the exporting country will dampen 
the probability of protection being invoked against the exporting country 
later. 
This two-period approach has been taken earlier by Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1976) who explored a similar ‘market-disruption’ problem where 
‘See the detailed discussion of these questions, and the impact on the political economy of 
protection, in Bhagwati (1986). 
J.N. Bhagwati et al., Quid pro quo foreign investment and weljare 129 
the export level in the first period influenced the probability of protection in 
the second period. Since this linkage is evidently of importance as well, our 
model below will essentially add the new linkage to theirs: between capital 
inflows from the exporting country now and the probability of protection 
later. 
The analysis could be extended to the industry-specific version of quid pro 
quo DFI. This raises interesting questions as well. For example, if Toyota 
restrains first-period exports and invests in the United States, Honda can be 
a free rider in two ways: it will profit from the protection-threat-dampening 
quid pro quo DFI of Toyota without having had to undertake such DFI 
itself; and if some protection materializes as VERs, which are generally 
allocated according to trade shares, Toyota’s first-period export restraint will 
yield Honda a larger share of the restricted second-period market! The 
analysis of such issues is, however, precluded by our approach in the present 
paper. 
Section 2 states the model and the problem. Section 3 provides the 
analysis. Concluding remarks are made in section 4. 
2. The problem and the model 
The problem we analyze is the following: what is the optimal policy for a 
country in regard to its trade and its DFI abroad if its export level and its 
DFI volume now will affect the probability of trade restrictions being 
invoked later by the other country in a two-country international economy? 
This problem, in a 2 x 2 x 2 framework and with single-period myopic 
behaviour, reduces of course to the well-known problem of optimal policy 
intervention by a country in the presence of international capital mobility, 
analyzed in classic contributions by Kemp (1966) and Jones (1967) and in a 
recent paper by Brecher (1983). Our analysis below therefore can be seen 
also as a generalization of this analysis to the case where such myopic policy 
intervention must be modified to take into account later-period effects of 
first-period decisions on trade and DFI levels. Symmetrically, our results 
below can be reduced to the KempJones results by simply putting the 
second-period effects to zero. 
As with the Bhagwati-Srinivasan (1976) analysis, we will assume a two- 
period model, making it therefore a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model focusing only on one 
country’s welfare. The (home) country will choose its optimal policies in 
regard to its trade and its DFI abroad, assuming the other (foreign) country 
to be passive in period I but reacting in period II to the first-period trade 
and DFI levels in the sense that these affect the probability of restrictions 
being invoked in the foreign country. At no stage, therefore, does the foreign 
country engage in optimal behaviour, in contrast to the home country. 
The home country’s optimizing behaviour, in turn, can be viewed as 
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involving optimization of trade and DFI levels in period I by taking into 
account also the repercussions of these on period II. As for period II, the 
home country is assumed to fix its trade level optimally, but we will assume 
DFI to be fixed where it was in period I3 
The model is now simply stated, using two goods, X and Y, two factors of 
production, K and L, two periods, I and II, and two countries, home and 
foreign. Utility, U, will be defined on consumption levels, C, and C,, of the 
two goods. The factor endowments of each country are given throughout the 
analysis, except for the capital flow between them. Variables for the foreign 
country will be marked by asterisks. Superscripts will refer to the period and 
subscripts x and y to the commodity and 1, 2 and 3 to the partial derivatives 
with respect to the number of the argument of the function. 
The home-country production-possibility function, identical for both 
periods, is 
Q, = P(Qy, l? -K, z) 
= F(Q,> K), (1) 
omitting endowments R and L since they are constant; the foreign-country 
production-possibility function similarly can be written as 
Q; = p*(Q:, R* + K, i;*) 
= F*(Q,*, K), (2) 
omitting again R* and L*; and the foreign transformation or reciprocal- 
demand function facing the home country is 
M, = $(E,, I?* + K, z*) 
where 
= @(E,, K), (3) 
Q, = home production of good X, the home-importable, 
Q, = home production of good Y, the home-exportable, 
M, = home imports of good X, 
E, = home exports of good Y, and 
K =home capital (DFI) in the foreign country, and the asterisks denote of 
course the corresponding variables and functions for the foreign 
country. 
‘This asymmetry may be justilied by the relative diffkulty of reversing DFI decisions once 
they have been implemented. In any case, the essence of our analysis would not be affected by 
complicating things to have also the trade level in period II constrained not to exceed the level 
chosen in period I. 
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Let U(C,, C,) be the standard social utility function defined in terms of the 
consumption of Ci of good i (i=x, y). Given the offer curve, eq. (3), the 
home-country consumption levels of X and Y can then be written as 
G=Q,+W,,W, C,=Q,-E,. 
Next, note also that the 4 function relates to total imports to exports and 
home capital abroad. Thus M, includes imports financed by rental earnings 
on capital exports and hence M,/E, is not the terms of trade. In fig. 1, AB is 
the foreign country’s production-possibility curve defined on R* and L* 
alone, and z is the terms of trade. (Qz,Qy*) represents the production vector 
for the production possibility curve defined on l?*+ K and L*, chosen 
competitively at z The consumption vector for the foreign country, however, 
reflects only national income [OG in terms of the X-good for reasons 
suggested by Bhagwati and Brecher (1980)] and is at (C:, C:). E, and M, are 






















the interest income, essentially a ‘transfer payment’ T to the home country, 
equalling Y*K where y* is the foreign rental rate in terms of good X.4 
We will next assume that the level of exports (E,) in period I will affect 
positively the probability of a trade restriction being invoked by the foreign 
country in period II, whereas the level of DFI(K) in period I will affect this 
probability negatively. Thus, we have the probability function 
G = G(E;, K’), (4) 
where G, > 0, G, < 0, with E$ being the period-I exports and K’ the period-I 
DFI by the home country. 
3. The analysis 
By assumption, then, it is known at the beginning of period II whether the 
trade restriction, in the form of a VER or import quota as .I!$*, has been 
“The corresponding equilibrium for the home country is illustrated in fig. 2, which is self- 
explanatory. 
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imposed by the foreign country or not. Thus, the policy of the home country 
in period II will be to maximize U subject to its production-possibility 
function and to the foreign transformation function, if no quota is imposed, 
and the added constraint E:‘zE, -” if the quota is imposed. The foreign 
country therefore is confined to trade quotas as its only policy instrument. 
In addition, we may now distinguish between two cases: (i) where the 
home country is constrained to keep its DFI frozen at its period-I level 
(which seems realistic since it is difficult to imagine DFI affecting the 
probability of trade restrictions being invoked by the host-foreign country if 
it is to be withdrawn right thereafter);’ and (ii) where DFI in period II is 
varied at will and as necessary to optimize home-country welfare. Only the 
former case is considered here, though the analysis can be readily extended 
to accommodate the latter case. 
We may then examine first the optimal policy-mix for the home country in 
period II, given these features of the model and then period-I optimal 
policies which must take into account also the period-II effects. 
3.1. Period-II optimal policy-mix 
Let the maximal welfare with and without the quota, Ei’, be U” and U”, 
respectively. We can then characterize the optimal policy-mix in both cases, 
and show that VI’< U”, for the cases where K” = K’. 
Quota imposed. If the foreign country invokes trade restrictions, then home 
exports and imports are restrained to I?:’ and Mf’. 
The optimizing solution for the home country then will yield u”, where 
U” = max U”( Cil, C:‘), 
subject to 
Ci’=Qf’+$(E~‘, K’), Ci’=Q:‘-Et’ and Qi’=F(Q:‘, K’). 




i.e., that the optimal policy for the home country is to equate the marginal 
domestic rate of substitution in consumption (DRS) with the marginal 
domestic rate of transformation in production (DRT). Hence, the import 
restriction abroad, say a VER, implies that the optimal policy response is to 
5Although the same could be said about the volume of trade in good Y, recall footnote 3 
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accommodate it by a home import restriction or tariff which generates the 
required trade volume and does not drive a wedge between DRT and DRS. 
Given E:’ (and K’), the question of equating DRT with FRT at some E, on 
the foreign offer curve defined by the 4 function is moot.6 
Now, since period-I DFI, K’, will have to be chosen, taking into account 
its impact on period-II utility, we need to investigate aU”/aK’, keeping in 
view period-I optimization later in the paper. Thus, it is evident that U” 
= lJ”(K’, Ei’). Then, we have 
a p 
aK’ 
= 1 KI+u:‘g. 
uII aci' 
Noting that 
$(F,S+F*) and F, = - #’ = FJQ;', K'), 
we have, using (5) and 
J=ac:I 32 aQ” 
p+q+$, 
aK’ aK” aK’ 
au” 
(6) 
Quota not imposed. If, however, in period II, the trade restrictions are not 
imposed, optimization by the home country in period II is now subject to 
unconstrained trade level (but given K’). The optimum solution will then 
yield U”, where 
0” = max U”(C:‘, C:‘), 
Subject to 
Ci’ = Qi’ + c&E:‘, K’), Ci’ = Q:’ - Ei’, and Qi’ = F(Qi’, K’). 







6We assume, of course, that Et’ is a binding constraint. 
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i.e., the optimal policy-mix requires again an optimal tariff or quota that 
equates DRS with DRT but also now with FRT (4’) in turn. 
Note again that we now have O”= O”(K’) and that we can derive 
do” 
-ZZZ L_J{‘[& _?“I. 
dK’ 
(9) 
It is also evident that iJ”> I_i”, the latter representing an optimal- 
equilibrium value with an added binding constraint (E:‘). 
3.2. Period-l optimal policy intervention 
We are now in a position to examine the optimal policy of the home 
country in period I, for that must be determined with a view towards the 
period-II effects of its period-I decisions. 
More exactly, we can now write the home country’s objective function in 
period I as 
t,b = U’(Cf, C;) + p[U”G + u”( 1 - G)], (10) 
where U’ is the first-period utility and p is the discount factor applied to the 
expected utility in period II where the two outcomes, 0” and U”, are 
weighted by their probabilities. The optimization problem then is 
max *, 
subject to 
C: = Qf + 4@:, K’L 
Maximizing with respect 
the Lagrangean multiplier 
C;=Q;-E; and Qi = F(Qi, K’). 
to Ci, C:, Qi, Q:, E: and K’, with Eli representing 
of the ith constraint, we then get the first-order 
conditions for an interior maximum. 
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a* _ I 
i?Q:=l.2+/-3F,=0, 
1 +&+2+j_3F2=0. (16) 





i”(- -F2)=42+$ i?u” dU” Gr7K’+(l--G+ II (19) 1 
The interpretation of these first-order conditions is fairly straightforward. 
First, (17) implies that DRS and DRT should be equated. 
At the same time, (18) implies that an optima1 tariff should be imposed, 
containing the two terms familiar from Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976): the 
standard optima1 tariff (which equates DRT to FRT, +i)’ and an added 
tariff resulting from the marginal change in expected utility in period II (duly 
discounted) that follows from a change in period-I exports [given by the 
second term of R.H.S. of (18)]. 
Finally, (19) implies that the quid pro quo DFI results in a capital-export 
tax-cum-subsidy reflecting two terms: the standard optima1 capital-export tax 
(equating y’ to #2 and reflecting the KempJones results for myopic 
maximization);8 and an added term due to the change in expected utility in 
period II [the square-bracketed expression on R.H.S. of (19)] resulting from 
a marginal change in capital inflow into the foreign country. The sign of 42, 
the first R.H.S. term in (19) is readily seen to be an indicator of how the 
import volume is affected by the capita1 outflow at the margin. This might be 
termed the capital-trade complementary/substitution effect and will reflect, 
‘For well known reasons this tariff is positive in the Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976) case 
where K=O. With K >O, as is the present case, however, the sign of this tariff is ambiguous as 
we know from Kemp (1966) and Jones (1967). 
*As these results show, the optimal foreign-investment tax and the corresponding optimal 
tariff are ambiguous in sign, but both cannot be negative simultaneously. 
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among other things, the relative capital-intensities of the two commodities 
abroad.’ 
Coming finally to the second, bracketed R.H.S. effect on expected period-II 
utility, we see that in turn it is composed of two effects. The first term, since 
i?” > ul’ and G, ~0, implies a subsidy on capital outflow: the quid pro quo 
effect is directly reflected here. As for the second, inner-bracketed effect, the 
change in the probability-weighted utility outcome in period II as period-I 
capital outflow is varied, this reflects (6) and (9), and can be negative, 
positive or zero. 
Note finally that the KempJones analysis emerges as a special case by 
simply putting period-II effects in (18) and (19) to zero. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The foregoing analysis has formalized quid pro quo DFI within the 
framework of the two-period analysis of threatened trade restrictions that 
was introduced by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976). It has indirectly served 
also to generalize the well-known one-period, myopic-optimization analysis 
by Kemp (1966) and Jones (1967) of optimal policy intervention in an open 
economy with capital mobility. 
‘Several important papers have recently analyzed the issue of such complementarity between 
capital flows and trade volumes. See Markusen and Svensson (1985) and Wong (1986) in 
particular. Wong also contains a useful analysis of several alternative ways in which such 
complementarity has been defined. 
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